In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.
Introduction
In this paper we examine the effects of financial incentives on physician behavior. We utilize a unique data set provided by HCA, The Health Care Company, a large hospital company that has employed as many as 2000 physicians nationwide. The data cover a period of two years during which the company transferred some of the doctors in its Florida practices from a system in which the doctors received a flat salary over to a profit-sharing compensation system.
Empirically we find that the institution of the performance-based pay plan had three main effects, consistent with the theory we present in the paper. First, the doctors that are switched from salary to the profit-sharing plan increase their profitability significantly, primarily through increases in output. Second, the least productive doctors leave the company. And third, the company is able to attract new doctors who are more productive on average than the doctors employed previously under the salary contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we present background information on the health care market in general, and HCA, specifically. We then present a literature review of previous studies on physician compensation and employee responses to financial incentives more generally. We then outline a theory that is an adaptation of a model developed by Edward Lazear (1996) in a paper on auto glass workers. Finally we present the empirical evidence from the analysis of our data on HCA physicians in Florida. The final section concludes and suggests an outline for future research.
Background
Historically, physicians have been self-employed. The typical contract between the insurer and the physician has been based on fee-for-service, in which the physician and the patient decided what care was appropriate and the doctor was reimbursed ex-post for the care provided. Under that system, health care costs, which were passed on to consumers, grew at an unsustainable rate. Consumers and their employers fought increased premiums, which led insurance companies to become much more vigilant about controlling costs.
From the standpoint of the physician, changes in the insurance industry have made the old model of the independent private practitioner unattractive. This is true for two reasons. First physicians are increasingly being asked to bear financial risk for the cost of delivering health care services under the insurance contract; second doctors have recognized the power in numbers in negotiating contracts with insurance companies. Both reasons have led physicians to join medical groups, either by forming partnerships or becoming employees in a physician organization (Robinson, 1999) . Today, in many markets, there now exists an organization between the insurance company and the doctors it contracts with, and that organization must decide how to compensate physicians. Occasionally, such as the case of HCA that we analyze in this paper, a hospital becomes the organization that employs the doctors.
In some markets, such as the Florida market we examine in this paper, physician groups are rarely asked to bear financial risk through capitated contracts.
1 Physicians are paid fee-forservice; the insurance company bargains for discounted prices and can keep doctors from having access to their patients by removing them from their list of network providers.
Hospital Ownership of Physician Groups
In the early to mid 1990s, hospitals were facing decreasing rates of hospital admissions.
Through a combination of increased pressure from insurance companies and improved technologies that moved the delivery of services to the outpatient setting, patients were being sent to hospitals less frequently, and even once admitted, they were being discharged faster. Hospitals felt pressure to compete for an ever-shrinking base of potential patients.
1 Capitated contracts pay a provider a fixed amount per patient enrolled in the plan. The cost of providing the care is then paid by the provider at the margin.
Purchasing physician practices became one of the critical components of the hospitals' strategies to ensure patient flows. As Jamie Robinson writes in his book on physician organization:
"The hospital is a business with high fixed and low marginal costs for whom the incremental patient admission is very valuable. Hospitals are fundamentally dependent on their affiliated physicians for patients and hence for revenue, yet historically have found it difficult to cement their relationships. The acquisition of physician practices is merely another facet of this effort, the acquisition of a future stream of hospital admissions (p. 181)."
Once the hospital purchased a practice, the doctors became employees of the hospital.
This represented a fundamental change in the hospital-physician relationship. Historically, doctors and hospitals had operated separate businesses. Each would contract separately with insurers, and doctors would contract for prices and admission privileges at any number of local hospitals. A physician's take-home pay was determined by the residual profits from the practice, which was divided up among the doctors in the practice in a manner determined solely by the doctors. Following the purchase of the physician practice, hospitals typically paid the doctors a flat salary.
From the hospital's perspective, the primary financial gain from purchasing physician practices may be generated on the hospital's books from increased flows of admissions from the employed doctors. Taking patient flows into consideration, it may still make financial sense for a hospital to purchase a practice even if the hospital will lose money on the practice itself.
HCA is the nation's largest, for-profit hospital company. At its peak in 1986, HCA owned 486 hospitals nationwide. Along with many other hospitals, both not-for-profit and forprofit, HCA began to aggressively court physician groups in the early 1990s. By 1998, HCA employed over 2000 physicians.
When Columbia purchased a physician group, the doctors in the practice were given a large cash sum plus a guaranteed annual salary. Jude Heritage Health Foundation) that bought several medical groups in an attempt to retain market share:
"… the Foundation had felt the need to provide a safety net under physician earnings to convince them to go along with the sale. Income guarantees are notorious, however, for undermining the subsequent productivity of the physicians. The effects of income guarantees were compounded by the newfound wealth of many Bristol Park physicians, who now wanted to work shorter hours and take longer vacations to enjoy their gains (p. 186)."
Columbia's primary financial consideration may have been the patient flows to hospitals.
In fact, HCA appeared so unconcerned with the financial performance of individual practices, that their financials were buried in the financial statements of the nearest hospital. HCA officials contend that until 1997, they did not know whether or not the practices were losing money.
In 1997, HCA changed it financial reporting standards for its physician practices. Each practice, and soon, each physician, were tracked with separate financial statements. Once HCA began to examine the numbers, they came to realize that HCA was losing roughly $100 million per year on the practices. Even if HCA was not in the physician practice business to make money from the practices, themselves, HCA did not want to lose a substantial amount of money. The company immediately took steps to alleviate the problem. The company ceased its acquisition strategy, and increased the oversight of the practices. In addition, the executives at HCA decided that financial incentives, or the lack of them, may have been a critical contributor in the financial shortfall. The new compensation system, Pre-Comp Earnings (PCE) was introduced in 1998.
Under PCE, the physician group pays HCA a fixed management fee of roughly $3,000/month per physician. The group then becomes a profit center, and the doctor's take-home pay is a fixed percentage (in the range of 85-95%) of the resulting profits generated by the practice. HCA keeps the balance. If the practice loses money, the doctors owe HCA the difference -so HCA does not share in the risk of losses Not all doctors were switched onto PCE at the outset. Some doctors had long-term contracts with guaranteed salaries. As salary contracts expired, HCA transferred doctors onto the PCE system. In addition, not all regional offices implemented the new compensation system immediately. The Florida Physician Services group was the first to offer PCE contracts; the data we employ in this paper is from the Florida division.
In the sections that follow, we examine the effect of the PCE contracts on physician behavior. This is not a study of whether hospitals should employ doctors, because it does not consider the effect of patient flows into the hospitals. The overall question of whether purchasing physician practices makes sense as a strategy for hospitals requires an examination of the patient flows as well as the financial performance of the practices. This is an area of research we hope to study, but it is not the focus of this paper. In this study, we focus solely on the financial performance and behavior of the physician practices. We can answer, empirically, the question of whether physicians work harder, or generate greater profitability, under profit sharing than salary. In addition, we can identify where improvements in productivity, if any, are generated.
Do doctors under profit sharing increase profitability through increased revenues or decreased costs? Finally, we will examine the relationship between the compensation systems and physician turnover. The hypothesis is that switching from salary to incentive-based compensation should lead to the least productive doctors leaving the company and more productive doctors being attracted to the firm. Before presenting our empirical findings, we summarize the findings from other studies in this area and outline our model of physician behavior under salary and profit sharing.
Literature Review
There has been some empirical literature examining the question of whether physicians change their behavior in response to financial incentives. In a study of for profit ambulatory care centers that switched their physician compensation method from salary to productivity pay based on net income, Hemenway et al. (1990) find evidence that physicians' productivity responds to financial incentives. They conduct a pre-post analysis of 15 physicians' responses to an incentive plan in which physicians earned either an hourly wage or a percentage of the gross monthly charges they generated, whichever was greater. This compensation scheme is essentially a wage guarantee with a bonus for productivity. All physicians, regardless of whether they qualified for the productivity pay or not, increased their monthly charges by an average of 20 percent after the new compensation program was put in place. The increases in charges were the result of increases in services provided per patient visit and increases in the number of office visits per month. Six of the fifteen physicians in this study generated enough monthly charges to qualify for the productivity pay in every month of the study. These physicians saw more patients and generated higher monthly charges before the implementation of the new compensation scheme compared to physicians who did not qualify for the productivity pay. This finding would seem to suggest some heterogeneity in "cost of effort" among the physicians included in this study; the physicians who qualified for the productivity pay seem to have the lower costs of effort compared to those who did not qualify.
Gaynor and Pauly (1990) estimate a "behavioral production function" for a crosssectional sample of medical group practices. The behavioral production function augments the traditional technical production function by incorporating the effects of individuals' responses to incentives. Their main objective is to examine the responsiveness of group members to productivity pay accounting for free-rider effects which are a function of the number of physicians in the group and the group's choice of compensation scheme. The authors hypothesize heterogeneity in physicians' tastes for producing efficiently, or analogously, cost of effort. These preferences determine the medical group's choice of compensation system. The compensation system is parameterized by and n where is the proportion of the individual's net income that he "keeps" for himself; 1-is the proportion that is placed in a pool to be evenly divided by the n physicians in the group. Survey data on physician preferences are the primary source of identification in the statistical model. The authors acknowledge that with cross-sectional data, the medical groups' choice of compensation system will be related to physicians' responsiveness to incentives, and hence endogenous in their model. The findings of the empirical model indicate that physicians' productivity (measured in number of office visits) responds positively to financial incentives. The authors also find that productivity is positively related to the physician's perception of how closely his pay is related to his productivity. Consistent with previous research on productivity and group size, the authors find a strong negative relationship between group size and productivity.
In a different setting, Lazear (1996) examines selection and productivity responses among auto glass installers who are given the option to participate in an incentive pay program.
The wage agreement is similar to that in the ambulatory care centers described previously; employees are given a wage guarantee combined with piece rate incentives designed to increase productivity. The employees are paid by piece rate when their productivity pay exceeds the guaranteed wage and are fired if their output falls below some minimally acceptable level. As noted earlier, this compensation arrangement is equivalent to a guaranteed salary with a minimum output requirement and a productivity bonus for output exceeding the minimum requirement.
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Lazear creates a microeconomic model to predict behavior following the introduction of this new compensation scheme. There are three primary results deriving from this model:
The first result predicts that output under piece rates must be greater than or equal to output under salary. Output will be strictly higher under piece rate when the firm sets the linear component of the piece rate contract (b) sufficiently high such that the optimal effort for some workers under the piece rate contract exceeds e 0 . The second result predicts that if some workers choose the piece rate and some workers choose the guaranteed salary, the average ability of the people employed by the firm will rise (i.e. a positive selection effect). Finally, the third result predicts that the variance of ability and output will rise if some workers choose the piece rate and some workers choose the guaranteed salary.
The empirical analysis generates confirming evidence for all three of the model's predictions. In particular, the author finds that on average, an employee's pay increased by 9.6%
under the knew compensation scheme and that productivity increased by 20%; thus employees captured roughly half the gains of the returns from their productivity increases. The author also finds a decrease in employees' use of sick leave and that the piece rate scheme works to select employees who are less likely to take sick leave. Two possible reasons for the success of this piece rate system are the observability of the output on which compensation was based and the easy detection and assignment of quality problems. Lazear speculates that managerial and professional jobs may not be as well suited to piece rate pay, presumably because of the lack of outcome observability and the difficulty with assessing and attributing the quality of the product.
Model
The model put forth in this paper is an adaptation to the model developed by Lazear to explain employees' responses to the introduction of a compensation scheme based on productivity. The changes are necessary to accommodate differences between the compensation scheme in the Lazear model and the compensation scheme offered to employees in the physician data we analyze. In the firm we study, employees were not offered a wage guarantee when the firm switched to productivity-based pay. The absence of a wage guarantee requires us to generalize the model described above to obtain predictions on employee output and ability levels.
Consider a firm that employs workers for a salary, s i , and requires some minimum level of effort from the worker, e 0 . In practice, effort cannot be observed by the employer; but output can be observed and is assumed to be some monotonically increasing function of effort. The employee's utility function is given by:
where A i is the innate ability of the employee which reduces the employee's cost of effort required to produce a given level of output. Ability is distributed in the population according to the distribution function F(A i ). Income, Y i , is wage income and equal to s i if the individual is employed under a salary contract. We assume there exists a diverse set of job opportunities present in the economy and the combination of these opportunities and the worker's ability generates a reservation utility, R(A i ), for each worker. The reservation utility is the utility the worker would derive from his or her most attractive job alternative and is assumed to be linear in the worker's ability (R'(A i )>0). Under these assumptions, the worker will accept a salary contract if and only if her utility exceeds R(A i ) when e i > e 0 . Under this contract, the rents (s i -C(e) / A i -R(A i )) if any, are captured solely by the worker. Under a linear piece rate contract (wages = b*e i + K), the employee chooses effort to maximize utility; this level of effort equates marginal benefit from increased effort with marginal cost (i.e., e is chosen such that b = C'(e i *)/A i ). Whether or not the employee will enter into the piece rate contract depends on whether utility from the piece rate contract exceeds the employee's reservation utility.
Let (b 0 , K 0 ) be the productivity-based employment contract that leads the lowest ability worker under salary (A 0,sal ) to generate the same output (e 0 ) and obtain the same utility as under the salary contract. An example of such a contract is illustrated in Figure 1 Proposition 2 states that the piece rate contract that retains the lowest ability worker under salary will also attract higher ability workers to the firm. Thus, the imposition of the piece rate contract (b 0 , k 0 ) results in two separate productivity enhancing effects for the firm: (1) individual productivity increases for everyone employed under the piece rate system except the lowest-ability worker (proposition 1 -the improvement effect); and (2) the productivity-based contract attracts higher ability workers to the firm (proposition 2 -the selection effect).
Whether or not the piece rate contract (b 0 , k 0 ) is optimal from the firm's point of view will depend on the distribution of ability in the population of potential employees and the marginal product of labor. The firm can select a different pool of workers by altering the two components of the wage contract. For example, as shown in Figure 4 , the firm can attract a pool of employees with a smaller (or greater) range in ability by lowering (or raising) k 0 . Similarly, the firm can attract more (or fewer) high ability employees by raising (or lowering) b 0 (see Figure   5 ).
Data
The data we employ in this paper are monthly financial data from HCA's Florida physician practices over the period January 1998 to December 1999. The sample includes data for 72 physician practices, encompassing 140 doctors. The median practice contains only one doctor and the maximum contains seven. The data contains information on the revenues generated by the practice as well as detailed cost information. Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the financial performance variables we employ in the following analyses. The data are presented for the entire sample of practices, as well as several important subgroups. Out of the 72 physician groups in the Florida data, 12 spend some portion of the sample under PCE, with transition dates staggered from over the whole sample. Groups are divided into practices that spend some time on PCE during the sample (12 groups, 3 are newly-hired), those that are always on salary (13 groups) and remain with HCA during the entire sample period, those that are always on salary but terminate their contract during our sample period (32 groups), and those that were hired during the sample period and do not start on PCE (15 groups). The groups that were hired after the beginning of 1998 did so with the understanding that they would eventually be compensated under PCE, so in terms of selection issues this group merits a separate evaluation.
The expenses and net income numbers are presented both with physician pay included and the pay netted out. We do this for two reasons. The first is that during this period many physicians who were transferred onto PCE received "loans" from HCA that are to be repaid, perhaps at a date beyond the end of our sample. The loans appear in the financial statements as physician income, with the subsequent repayment appearing as negative income in some later month. Without any ability to identify true compensation as opposed to loans, expenses minus compensation provides a cleaner measure of true practice cost. The second reason is that the structure of the PCE system suggests a direct relationship between profits net of physician compensation and the resulting compensation. Once the transition and loans are no longer in effect, the PCE plan allows for the doctors to receive a fixed percentage of the profits.
Essentially, HCA provided incentives for the doctors to make the resulting pie as large as they could, and they could have essentially all of it. Netting out the physician compensation from both costs and profits is a test of what happens to the profit pie once the doctors take-home pay is linked directly to the net income of the practice.
The three basic empirical hypotheses we test for in the next section are apparent from this table of averages. First, the groups that switch onto PCE perform significantly better under PCE than they did under salary. Net income, measured net or inclusive of physician compensation increases significantly. This increase is generated almost entirely through an increase in revenues, which nearly double ($22,000/doctor to $39,000/doctor). It is important to note that this change in revenues occurs over a period of time where the prices the doctors are receiving are constant, so that any change in revenues must be due to changes in quantities. This is the first evidence that transferring doctors onto PCE results in a significant increase in the physicians' efforts.
The second effect is the selective attrition of poorly performing groups. The groups that leave HCA without ever switching onto PCE are the lowest productivity performers. They bring in the least amount of revenues per doctor ($18,000) and earn the least profits (-$16,000). The final effect is that the groups that are enticed to join HCA under the new compensation regime are more profitable than average doctor under the salary regime. The new practices produce more revenues and lose less money than all groups other than the groups already operating under PCE.
This is the first evidence that switching to profit sharing results in self-selection of profitable groups.
The final observation to point out from these simple averages is that HCA was losing a significant amount of money on their physician practices prior to implementing the PCE contracts. At $11,000 in loses per doctor per month, it is not unreasonable that HCA was, in fact, losing more than $100,000,000 when they first examined the books in 1997. In fact, the Florida doctors must be worse than the average HCA doctor, since 2000 doctors losing $4,200/month would result in a $100 million dollar loss.
Empirical Results
We estimated regressions of the following form:
Where performance is a practice's monthly financial performance: profits, revenues, or costs. As indicated by the subscripts, this regression is estimated on a panel data set comprised of monthly observations (t) on each practice (i). EverPCE is categorical variable that is 1 if a practice operates under PCE at any time during the sample. PCENow indicates whether the practice is under PCE during that particular month. Quit indicates whether a practice left HCA during our sample period. 4 The fourth term is a time trend. In addition, we included controls for whether or not the group was hired by HCA after the beginning of our sample. Finally we include controls for whether the month period was December 5 or whether it was in the final three months of a practice's involvement with HCA.
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. During the time period of our analysis, HCA officials have told us that the reimbursement agreements with the insurance companies were relatively stable. More 4 It is important to note that either party could have initiated the separation of the practice and the company. HCA executives in Florida mentioned several cases in which a practice was, in effect, terminated by HCA. But in the data, we can not identify quits from terminations. 5 There appeared to be some systematic accounting where costs and revenues were shifted to year-end in a way that seemed unrelated to any actual medical activities.
importantly, there was no systematic correlation between the transition of any doctors onto PCE contracts and the renegotiations of any contracts with insurance companies. We therefore interpret the bulk of any changes in revenues to be the result of changes in quantities of services provided and not changes in prices. Changes in the quantities of services provided can mean many things, including increased effort, or simply a reshuffling of services provided from poorlyreimbursed activities to more highly-reimbursed activities. With additional data, we hope to disentangle the exact nature of any change in behavior.
The regressions presented in Table 2 allow us to identify differences in averages across the groups of physician practices identified in the previous section. The relevant groups in the HCA data are the following:
1. Groups paid on salary for the entire sample period that remain with HCA until the end of the sample (the control group). 2. Groups on salary for the entire sample that separate from HCA (Quit: always on salary). 3. Groups eventually placed on PCE (PCE at any point -Data is presented for both their salary and PCE periods.) 4. Groups newly hired by HCA (newly-hired group).
All of the data in the sample is at the doctor level, so that cross-practice comparisons are possible. The first group, those practices that are always on salary and do not quit, is the omitted group from the regression. The average revenue, per month, per doctor for that group is $42,838.
The lowest productivity group in the sample is the quitters; those practices that leave the company. On average, those groups bring in $25,872 per doctor (42,838-16,967) each month, or 60% of the control. The difference between the quitters and the control group is statistically significant suggesting support for the hypothesis that profit sharing can result in the selective retention of more productive workers.
The groups that are eventually switched onto PCE are slightly more productive in terms of revenue per doctor than the quitters. During their time on salary, the eventual PCE doctors garnered roughly 68% as much revenue per doctor as the control group.
The coefficient of greatest interest is the one for Current PCE. This variable equals one if the practice is currently operating under a PCE contract and zero otherwise. The combination of this coefficient with the PCE Ever coefficient show that, on average, the groups under PCE bring in less revenues per doctor than groups that never go under PCE (42,838-13,715+6,548 compared to 42,838). However, productivity is higher for that group under PCE than under salary. In particular, while the eventual-PCE group earns 68% as much as the always-salary group, groups on PCE earns 83% as much as the control group. Being on PCE leads those groups to produce an additional $6,500/doctor each month. That difference, although large in magnitude, is only statistically significant at the 17% level. This is the first indication, however, that switching from salary to PCE may have a positive effect on the productivity of doctors who convert to the new compensation scheme.
The final effect we test for is whether the doctors that are attracted to the new compensation plan are more productive than the average doctor from the salary regime. The coefficient on New Doctor is positive and significant, indicating that the newly hired doctors are, in fact, more productive than any other group of practices. The size of the effect is large, with the new physicians bringing in 125% of the revenue of the always-salary group.
Given that the PCE compensation system is a profit-sharing system, the doctors theoretically have an incentive to improve the bottom line either through increasing revenues or through decreasing their costs. Columns 2 through 5 present the results on costs and net income.
As we did in Table 1 , we utilize two measures for costs and profits, one that nets out the physician compensation component and one that does not.
The pattern with costs is similar to the pattern with revenues. The physicians that ultimately leave the company do have lower costs, but not enough to offset the lower revenues.
That group, in fact, loses the most money per doctor of any group. The practices that eventually are placed on PCE also have lower costs. Their costs are low enough that, the practices on PCE generated similar profits to the always-salary group. The newly hired doctors have higher costs and higher profits than all of the comparison groups did.
As with revenues, the productivity effect of switching from salary to PCE is identified with the coefficient on PCE in Current Month. When revenues are used as the dependent variable, this coefficient was positive, but only marginally significant. When costs are used as the dependent variable, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. When profits net of physician compensation is used as the dependent variable the coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that the groups switched onto PCE earned an extra $8,300
($6,385+$1,953) per doctor in profits per month, holding fixed the amount paid out to the doctors. This amount is very large relative to the $13,000/doctor the group was losing on average under salary. In column 4, when net income including physician compensation is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on PCE in Current Month is smaller in magnitude and not significantly different from zero. This difference may have been due to the loans discussed earlier.
Omitted variable bias is a potential concern in the previous regressions. The concern is that there may be unobserved heterogeneity within the groups of physicians that are transferred onto PCE. We ran the basic regression with practice group fixed effects, such that any unobserved differences across the PCE groups are captured by the group-specific intercepts. The results are presented in table 3.
With a fixed effects model, the basic results on the effect of switching onto PCE remain the same. Switching onto PCE has a positive effect on profitability, and the effect comes almost entirely from changes in revenues and not costs. The fixed effects appear to be important, as the magnitude of the effect is significantly higher than in the OLS regressions. The results for revenues are presented in column 1. The PCE effect is shown by the coefficient on the PCE in roughly $19,000/doctor each month in revenues. Average revenues per doctor for the PCE practices during their time on salary was roughly $30,000, so this suggests an increase of roughly 60% in revenues as a result of the transition onto PCE. Remember, this transition occurs over a period of time where the prices received per procedure are constant, so the changes in revenue must have been generated through changes in quantities. The magnitude of this change in revenues is very large and is not simply a function of the business getting better with time. While it is true that the bulk of the PCE months occur late in the sample, the time trend captures any average increase through time. In addition, figure 6 shows that the average performance across all groups is relatively constant over time. The sample averages for all three dependent variables are essentially flat over time, and this is true even though some of the worst performing practices were leaving the company.
There is a positive and marginally significant PCE effect on expenditures when salaries are not netted out (column 2). The increase of $7,600/doctor does not balance out the much larger increase in revenues, however. When salaries are netted out, as shown in column 3, the PCE effect on costs is zero. Again, this difference may have to do with the transition loans that HCA gave to many of the PCE doctors. Those appear as positive salary numbers in the financial statements and then later as negative entries as the loans are repaid.
Given that the PCE effect on revenue is so large relative to any countervailing effect on costs, it is not surprising that there is also a large positive effect on profitability. Net income is examined in columns 4 and 5. In column 4 physician compensation is included, and in column 5 it is netted out. With the compensation numbers included, the physicians who were switched onto PCE earned an extra $8,600/doctor in profits each month. Without the compensation numbers included, the groups earned an extra $17,000/doctor each month. These numbers are consistent with the group averages presented in Table 1 , where the PCE doctors doubled their revenues and increased their net incomes per doctor to $22,500/doctor when physician pay was netted out.
Conclusions
We find empirical evidence to support our three main hypotheses, that the poorly performing doctors would leave, that more productive doctors would be induced to join, and those groups placed under PCE would be more profitable. Increased revenues and not decreased costs were the primary source of financial gain for the practices placed under PCE. This occurred at a time when the underlying prices for the services provided were roughly constant, so the significant increase in revenues must have come from an increased quantity of services provided or a reshuffling of services provided towards more highly-reimbursed activities.
Ultimately, we hope to analyze more specific data regarding the activities of the doctors over this time period. With those data, we will be able to identify the exact source of the gain in revenues, and be able to more accurately determine whether this change is beneficial to patients or not. The anecdotal stories conveyed to us by HCA officials describe doctors that previous worked enough to see 15 patients a day, and that under PCE the doctors see 30 a day. That size of a change in effort, without any other change in mix of services provided could certainly result in the near doubling of revenues we find in the data. Again, doctors could achieve those numbers by seeing each patient for less time per visit. Without the detailed data on physician activity, it is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about welfare changes as a result of this new compensation system. Of particular concern is the effect on quality of care. It is certainly plausible that physician practice financial performance and quality of patient care are not perfectly correlated. In order to analyze the welfare effects of these compensation systems fully, one would have to consider the effect on patient health outcomes.
financially by owning physician practices. The financial performance of the practice itself, which we analyze here, is only part of the financial benefit to hospitals. Perhaps the largest gain from solidifying relationships with doctors in the community is to ensure larger flows of admissions into the hospitals themselves. Again, this is another area where we hope to analyze more detailed data on physician activity. Before implementing PCE, many officials at HCA had decided that purchasing physician practices had proven itself to be a bad business, and that the company should divest itself of its practices as quickly as it could. With the current success of PCE, the company has begun to look seriously at further acquisitions. Some company officials, however, are skeptical that purchasing practices has any effect on patient flows, both when the practices are purchased and later when practices are let go. Testing that conjecture will be an important part of answering the broader question of whether hospitals, in general, should seek to expand their firm boundaries to include physicians. 
